Inside FIFA’s Failed $20 Billion Plan to Sell a World Cup Stake

The World Cup nearly became an investment product. Fresh off the biggest tournament in soccer history, FIFA proposed creating a $20 billion commercial company tied to its most valuable competitions. Private investors could buy up to 20% of that business, giving FIFA as much as $4.2 billion in immediate capital.

The pitch was simple: FIFA would keep sporting control, investors would own a minority stake, and soccer federations worldwide would receive more development money.

The reaction was explosive. UEFA, CONCACAF and the Asian Football Confederation pushed back. Officials threatened boycotts, internal opposition spilled into public view, and the plan collapsed before FIFA’s 211 member associations could hold a final vote.

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Key Takeaways

• FIFA proposed a new commercial company called FIFA Forward Enterprise.
• The business was valued at approximately $20 billion.
• Private investors could have purchased a non-controlling stake of up to 20%.
• FIFA hoped to raise as much as $4.2 billion.
• Media rights, sponsorships, ticketing, licensing and tournament operations would move into the new company.
• FIFA said it would retain full control of competitions and sporting decisions.
• Member associations could have accessed up to $20 million in additional funding.
• The proposal faced immediate opposition and was withdrawn before a final vote.
• UEFA is considering legal action, while pressure continues to build around FIFA president Gianni Infantino.

FIFA Was Not Literally Selling the World Cup

The plan did not involve selling the tournament, its name or its championship trophy. Instead, FIFA wanted to separate its commercial machinery from its regulatory role.

The proposed company, FIFA Forward Enterprise, or FFE, would have managed the money-generating operations surrounding the World Cup and other FIFA competitions.

That included:

• Broadcast and streaming rights
• Sponsorship agreements
• Ticketing operations
• Licensing and merchandise
• Tournament logistics
• Other commercial partnerships

FIFA would have remained the majority owner. It also insisted that private investors would receive no authority over competition formats, match calendars, regulations or sporting decisions.

That distinction mattered legally. It did not calm the backlash. Critics argued that anyone investing billions in World Cup revenue would eventually demand influence, even without a formal vote on soccer matters.

The $20 Billion Pitch

The numbers were enormous. FIFA valued the proposed commercial business at approximately $20 billion and planned to offer outside investors a stake of up to 20%. That would have generated as much as $4.2 billion in fresh capital.

Joshua Kushner’s Thrive Eternal was positioned to lead the investor group. JPMorgan bankers were involved in the process, while former Liberty Media CEO Greg Maffei reportedly served as a commercial adviser.

FIFA’s proposed structure looked similar to deals already seen across European soccer. Governing bodies and leagues create separate companies for their commercial rights, then sell minority stakes to investors in exchange for immediate cash.

But the World Cup is not a domestic league or privately owned franchise. It is a global competition built around national teams and governed by 211 member associations. That made the politics far more complicated than FIFA and its prospective investors appeared to expect.

How the World Cup Stake Would Have Worked

Under the proposal, private investors would buy shares in FIFA Forward Enterprise—not FIFA itself. FIFA would retain at least 80% ownership and continue controlling:

• Competition rules
• Tournament formats
• International calendars
• Refereeing and disciplinary matters
• Host selection
• Every other regulatory or sporting decision

The investors would gain exposure to the commercial value generated by FIFA’s tournaments through at least 2038. They would be betting that World Cup broadcasting, sponsorship, ticketing and licensing revenue would continue climbing. Their stake could then become more valuable and potentially be sold during a future FIFA-controlled tender process.

On paper, the investors would provide capital without running the competition. In practice, billions of dollars rarely arrive without expectations.

Why Investors Wanted a Piece of the World Cup

Live sports have become some of the most valuable content left in media. Viewers can skip commercials, cancel cable packages, and ignore most entertainment releases. Major sporting events still demand attention in real time—and few events command a larger global audience than the World Cup.

The investment case was easy to understand:

Scarcity

There is only one men’s World Cup every four years. No competitor can recreate its history, national identity or global reach.

Expanding Inventory

The 2026 tournament expanded to 48 teams and 104 matches, creating more tickets, broadcasts, sponsorship inventory and commercial opportunities.

Rising Media Value

Streaming platforms are increasingly competing with traditional broadcasters for premium sports rights. That competition can push future rights fees higher.

Global Sponsorship Demand

The World Cup gives major brands access to audiences across nearly every market. FIFA can sell regional and global packages across multiple commercial categories.

Ticketing Power

World Cup tickets remain among the most coveted in sports. Dynamic pricing and premium hospitality create additional revenue, even if they also produce fan frustration.

Licensing

Video games, trading cards, apparel, collectibles and other licensed products turn the World Cup into a year-round commercial property.

Private investors were not buying goals or national pride. They were buying exposure to one of the strongest revenue engines in sports.

Why FIFA Wanted the Money

FIFA argued that the investment would spread soccer’s wealth beyond the sport’s traditional powers. Under the proposed funding model, each member association could have accessed up to $20 million during the coming World Cup cycle. That money could be used for:

• Training facilities
• Youth academies
• Coaching programs
• Women’s soccer
• Domestic competitions
• National-team development
• Grassroots participation

Future allocations could have increased to $22 million and then $24 million across the following World Cup cycles. For smaller federations, those figures would be transformative. A country without major broadcast contracts or wealthy domestic clubs could build facilities and development programs that would otherwise take decades to finance.

That was FIFA’s strongest argument: use the World Cup’s commercial power to reduce the gap between wealthy soccer nations and everyone else. The problem was how the deal was constructed—and how it was introduced.

Why Soccer’s Power Brokers Revolted

The proposal moved quickly, with many soccer officials claiming they were given too little information about one of the biggest financial decisions in FIFA history. That triggered several major concerns.

Lack of Transparency

Critics wanted to know who would invest, what rights they would receive, how the company would be governed, and how future profits would be divided.

FIFA promised that investors would not control sporting decisions. Opponents questioned whether financial influence could exist without formal authority.

Shareholder Pressure

FIFA is a nonprofit governing body. Private investment funds exist to generate returns. Those missions can coexist—but they can also collide.

An investor seeking a higher valuation might favor more matches, higher ticket prices, additional sponsorship inventory or streaming deals that place games behind subscription paywalls.

FIFA’s Dual Role

FIFA would remain both soccer’s global regulator and the controlling owner of a commercial enterprise built around the competitions it regulates.

That structure raised questions about conflicts of interest. Decisions presented as sporting choices could also increase the value of the commercial company.

The World Cup’s Identity

The loudest criticism was emotional, not financial. National federations and supporters argued that the World Cup is a shared global institution, not an asset that any single administration should package and partially sell.

Private investment is accepted across American sports. The NFL, NBA, MLB and MLS all allow institutional capital into ownership structures.

The World Cup occupies different ground. It represents countries, national identity and more than nine decades of soccer history. That made the idea of selling a stake feel fundamentally different.

What the Deal Could Have Meant for American Fans

The United States sits at the center of the sports-investment boom, making it especially relevant to American viewers. FFE could have changed how fans watched, attended, and consumed future World Cups.

More Streaming Exclusives

Future U.S. media-rights deals could attract major streaming platforms. That might generate more money for FIFA while requiring fans to add another subscription.

Higher Ticket Prices

Ticketing would have been part of the commercial company. Investors would naturally want FIFA to maximize demand through premium seating, hospitality and dynamic pricing.

More Sponsorship

Broadcasts, stadiums, fan zones and digital platforms could carry even more branded content.

Expanded Events

FIFA has repeatedly added matches and competitions. A commercial partner would benefit from additional inventory, increasing concerns that business incentives could influence the soccer calendar.

None of those outcomes were guaranteed. But once outside investors share in the upside, every commercial decision receives a new layer of scrutiny.

How the Plan Fell Apart So Quickly

FIFA unveiled the proposal expecting to begin a consultation process with its 211 member associations. Instead, opposition arrived almost immediately.

UEFA and its 55 federations led the revolt. CONCACAF and the Asian Football Confederation also rejected the plan, leaving FIFA without enough political support to move confidently toward a vote.

The internal damage was just as significant. FIFA officials publicly distanced themselves from the project, while senior adviser Carlos Cordeiro resigned.

Less than a week after the proposal became public, FIFA withdrew it. The collapse was not just a rejection of private investment. It was a rejection of the process, the timing and the trust required to complete a deal of this scale.

The Fallout Is Bigger Than the Failed Deal

The proposal is dead for now. The political fight is not. UEFA has warned FIFA that it is considering legal action connected to the FFE plan. Its lawyers also instructed senior FIFA officials to preserve relevant documents and electronic communications.

Several national federations have withdrawn their support for Infantino ahead of FIFA’s next presidential election. UEFA is reportedly exploring possible rival candidates. That turns a failed commercial proposal into a leadership crisis.

Infantino has survived controversy before, but this battle strikes at the heart of FIFA’s political structure. A FIFA president needs support from national associations across multiple confederations. Losing Europe, North America and parts of Asia creates a dangerous coalition against him.

Could FIFA Try Again?

Probably—but not with the same structure or rollout. The World Cup’s commercial value is too large for FIFA to stop looking for ways to monetize it more aggressively. Outside investors will remain interested because live global sports assets are scarce and increasingly valuable.

A future proposal could include:

• Greater member consultation
• Clearer governance protections
• Public disclosure of potential investors
• Independent oversight
• Limits on investor influence
• Stronger ticketing and broadcast-access guarantees
• A smaller initial stake
• Investment restricted to specific commercial projects

FIFA could also raise money without selling equity by borrowing against future revenue, pre-selling media rights or forming project-specific partnerships.

The financial logic behind FFE has not disappeared. FIFA simply learned that the World Cup cannot be treated like another franchise acquisition.

Final Take: The World Cup Has a Price—But Not an Owner

FIFA’s proposal exposed the central conflict shaping modern sports. The World Cup is both a global cultural institution and a multibillion-dollar entertainment business. Fans view it through history, identity and competition. Investors see scarce content, rising rights fees and enormous untapped revenue.

Both views are true. FIFA believed it could separate commercial ownership from sporting control. Its critics believed that selling one would eventually influence the other.

The deal collapsed because FIFA never convinced soccer’s stakeholders that billions in private capital could enter the room without changing who held the power.

The World Cup will continue generating record revenue. Investors will continue searching for a way in. But this episode delivered a clear warning: global soccer may be a business, but its biggest tournament still cannot be sold like one.